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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ESTHER B. KING, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
Case No. 
vs. 1· 12056 
LA WREN CE M. KING, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
This Reply Brief is submitted to correct misstate-
ments of the record contained in Respondent's Brief, 
and to clarify the facts in issue. 
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RESPONDENT'S BRIEF ON ITS 
STATE~IENT OF FACTS 
PAGE 11HREE, 11HIRD PARAGRAPH. 
Here Respondent denies that the trial court awarded 
her $250.00 per month alimony because she was dis-
abled when the divorce was heard. Appellant contends 
there is no other reason in the record for her receiving 
such award, so the award of alimony was immediately 
connected to her inability to work. The possibility that 
the award was based simply on the marriage itself is 
not sustained by the evidence, because it was Respond-
ent's third marriage, she had no children by it, and due 
to the property settlement she received, she left the 
marriage much better off financially than she entered 
it. Pinion v. Pinion, 92 U. 255, 262, 67 P2d 265, (Fair 
property settlement for childless marriage, if wife cap-
able of self-support, suffices to meet husband's obliga-
tion without alimony in addition). 
PAGE THREE, BOTTOM PARAGRAPH, 
AND PAGE FOUR. Respondent quotes a medical 
report from Dr. Hess, (Def. Ex. 1). Dr. Hess did a 
spinal fusion on her back on March 31, 1968. The court 
should note that her quotes from the medical report start 
with an incomplete sentence, and include other incom-
plete sentences. The first quote used by Respondent 
indicates that as of the date of the medical report, June 
17, 1969, just before the hearing on July 11, 1969, that 
Dr. Hess stated, 
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She was also given explicit instructions as to 
how to lift and how to bend and to avoid heavy 
lifting. She was told to try and get by with what 
she had. She was explicitly told how to lift and 
bend so that she would avoid injuring her spine 
at a higher level. X-rays on that occasion showed 
a solid fusion from L-5 to the sacrum. 
In fact this quotation has nothing to do with Respond-
ent's condition in 1969. These are instructions Dr. Hess 
gave her in September, 1968, to guide her while she was 
recovering from the fusion. 
As to her condition in June 1969, Respondent quotes 
Dr. Hess as stating, 
" .... she was advised to be careful with heavy 
lifting. She was to squat to lift all objects and 
was told that if she persisted with heavy lifting 
she might wear out the next disc above . . . . " 
This quotation omits Dr. Hess' prior sentence which 
states, "It was my impression that she had an excellent 
post-operative result of an L5-Sl fusion and that there 
was no need to take additional X-rays, especially where 
she was trying to cut down on expenses and this also 
was being handled as a welfare case." (Def. Ex. 1). 
Further Respondent continues from Dr. Hess' 
report, page four, paragraph 2 of her brief, 
" .... If one were to rate her as to permanent 
impairment, her permanent partial impairment 
as loss of body function would be approximately 
ten percent." 
3 
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Here, Respondent omits Dr. Hess' prior statement 
which reads, "As you can see above, this patient, in 
my opinion, made a good recovery from an L5-Sl de-
generate disc. She is capable of doing everything but 
the heaviest of lifting." (Emphasis added). 
The total effect of the omissions is to lead the court 
to find Respondent disabled beyond the true facts. 
PAGE SIX, PARAGRAPH 1. Respondent 
states, 
Appellant also testified that his new wife re-
ceived $150.00 per month from her ex-husband 
as support money ... 
In fact, Appellant testified that his new wife was sup-
posed to receive $150.00 per month from her ex-husband, 
but she often did not get it. ( R-60, p. 37, L3-24). 
PAGE SIX, PARAGRAPH 2. If Respondent 
wants the court to take all income of Appellant into 
consideration as a benefit to him, as stated in this para-
graph, including child support received by his present 
wife for her four children, it would only be fair to give 
him credit for the total support of all six people in his 
home, for which $485.00 per month ($335.00 when the 
support money isn't received) , is not an excessive sum. 
Appellant acknowledges that a first marriage is a first 
obligation. His point is simply that single, or remarried, 
he can barely get by. (R-60, p. 35, Ll7-27). 
In Respondent's statement of facts and her Argu-
ment, Point II, she gives the impression that she is in 
4 
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very poor health and under a good deal of medical at-
tention. This confuses past difficulties with her con-
dition at the time of the hearing on Appellant's Motion 
to modify the Decree on July 11, 1969. As of the date 
of that hearing, by Respondent's own testimony, the 
following points are clear: ( 1) she had not been sick 
since the spinal fusion in March, 1968, and was re-
ceiving no medical treatment for her back. (R-60, p.48, 
L9-16; p.50, Ll9-29; p.55, L2-7); (2) she required 
no medical attention at all other than an annual physical 
and occasional nerve pill, (R-60, p.53, L3-9; p.53, L29-
p.54, L4; p.66, L22-25); ( 3) she could bend, lift and 
work, (Def. Ex. l; R-60, p.50, Ll9-29; p.55, L2-7; 
p.57, L23-30; p.62, Ll8-p.63, L7); ( 4) her nervous 
condition is not disabling, (R-60, p.65, L9-27). 
Clearly as argument, but hopefully as logical argu-
ment, Appellant contends that Respondent cannot have 
it both ways. That is, claim that she is disabled, but 
also claim that she has looked for work and is willing 
to work. If she doesn't think she is sound, why' did she 
apply for work? The answer is in her only applying 
for "several" jobs in the 16 months from the fusion 
to the hearing. She doesn't want to look like a ma-
lingerer, so she says she is trying to find work, but she 
is careful not to try so hard that she gets it. Her job 
applications, in themselves, show that she knows that 
she can work. If she couldn't and were truly disabled, 
she could easily have had medical testimony to that 
effect, and would ha Ye felt no need to build a record 
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on her job efforts. The only conclusion, it is argued, 
is that she herself knows that she is employable. 
It is along this line of reasoning, that the error 
of the trial court is clear. Its conclusions are based on 
its Findings, ~2: " ... plaintiff is unable to bend or 
stoop to do things; further her back condition has ren-
dered her unable to secure employment or hold em-
ployment ... " (R-62). In fact, Dr. Hess said she 
could bend and lift, and she never testified that she 
couldn't. How too could the court accurately find she 
couldn't "secure employment," when she hadn't really 
sought it, and how could the court accurately find she 
couldn't "hold employment" when she never worked in 
the 16 months between fusion and hearing? 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF. ARGUMENT. 
POINT I. Respondent states, 
"Appellant's argument in Point I is based en-
tirely on a misconception of the trial court's posi-
tion in a prior proceeding. Here, apparently, the 
Appellant is referring to a prior hearing in which 
the parties attempted by stipulation to amend 
the decree of divorce, but were unable to agree, 
and subsequently were under the impression tha_t 
the court was going to make an order based on a 
stipulation that the parties never agreed to." 
Respondent's position, apparently, is that the court 
entered no written order, concerning Appellant's Peti-
tion for l\iodification, prior to its written decision signed 
March 20, 1970, and that accordingly that decision is 
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entitled to full weight. This contention is contrary to 
the record. 
Both Appellant's and Respondent's attorneys agreed 
in open court (R-68-69), that the court did make a 
verbal order in chambers at the conclusion of the evi-
dence on the petition for modification on July I I, 
1969. This verbal order was that the court would, (I) 
reduce alimony $50.00 per month forthwith, and ( 2) 
require Respondent to go to work, and then determine 
what further reduction should be made as her earnings 
proved out. The court did invite a stipulation of coun-
sel, but this was that if the parties could agree on a 
figure representing Respondent's future earnings, the 
court would use that figure in making the further re-
duction of alimony contemplated in part 2 of the order. 
I 
'Vhen the parties could not agree on this figure, Re-
spondent's own attorney drew the order as per the 
court's verbal order, even though this reduced Respond-
ent's alimony. The court sat on this order. It never 
rejected nor affirmed it, nor asked counsel to reappear. 
Finally, Appellant's counsel petitioned the court to sign 
the order. ( R-54-56) . That petition was heard Sep-
tember 9, I969. (R-67, p.I-3). At that hearing the 
court then offered to enter an order giving Appellant 
$50.00 per month relief. This was refused as being 
inadequate. The court then ordered that Appellant's 
petition be denied altogether, and that Respondent's 
counsel draw appropriate Findings and Order. This 
was done. Then the court did not act until March 20, 
1970, when it finally signed the written order. In all, 
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over nine months elapsed between the hearing and the 
signing. This is set forth in detail in Point I of Appel-
lant's Brief. The point to be made here, is that while 
the court only signed one order, it first made one verbal 
order, and later offered a second verbal order, before 
finally signing the third. 
However, even if both counsel misunderstood the 
court, whether the court made an order or suggested 
a stipulation, either way, at the close of the evidence, 
the court felt that Respondent could and should work, 
and Appellant obtain relief. This is contrary diametric-
ally to the court's final order. 
While favoring the Findings of the trial court, still, 
in an appeal concerning alimony, the Appellate Court 
reviews the facts de novo. Pinion v. Pinion, supra; Hen-
drick v. Hendrick, 91 Utah 553, 558, 63 P2d 277; 
Hampton v. Hampton, 86 Utah 570, 572, 47 P2d 419. 
This rule has particular application when the trial court 
has been inconsistent. Drury v. Lunsberg, 18 U2d 74, 
77, 415 P2d 662. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SAMUEL KING 
King, Craft & Bullen 
Attorneys for Defendant-
Appellant 
409 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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